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RECENT CASES 135
would be subjected to physical persecution"1 was modified by the present
statute so as to authorize the action if the Attorney General's opinion was
that the facts existed. This would indicate that the withholding of deporta-
tion under such circumstances rests wholly within the administrative judgment
and opinion of the Attorney General or his delegate. 12 The courts may inter-
vene when an alien has been denied appropriate procedural due process or a
fair consideration of his application,' :' but, if these requirements have been
met, they are powerless to modify the Attorney General's final decision.'
It has never been contended that the judiciary may pardon or mandamus tile
executive to pardon. It seems equally certain that the Attorney General's
power of clemency in this instance is one which has been placed beyond tile
reach of the courts.1 5
K. L. GILCHRIST
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY FOR
INVOKING PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF - INCRIMINATION - The Circuit Court
ordered disbarment of an attorney for invoking the privilege against self-in-
crimination before a Senate sub-committee, when questioned in connection
with alleged membership in the Communist Party. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida it was held, one justice dissenting, that the order be re-
versed. The mere invocation of the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination, is not sufficient to justify disbarment. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d
657 (Fla. 1955).
A state can dismiss certain types of employees for exercising the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination.' For example, the exercise of the
privilege by a police officer is deemed incompatible with his prescribed
11. 64 Stat 1010 (1950), 8 U. S. C. §156 (1950).
12. U. S. ex rel Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); U. S.
ex rel Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953) (The courts :nay not tubstitute
their judgment for his). See also a communication to the Yale Law Journal 'rom Senator
Pat McCarran (D. Neb.), 17 January 19.53: "The change in the language of the provision
as it now appears in the Immigration and Nationality Act was motivated by a desire to
clarify the provision to make it perfectly clear that a determination of whether or :lot he
deportation of an alien should be withheld in such cases is solely within 1he discretion
of the Attorney General."
13. U. S. ex tel Accardi v. Shaughoessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954); U. S. ex rel Teong
Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); U. S. ex rel Dotenz v. Shaugh-
nessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. Barreiro v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1954) (Attorney General need :tot
have suspended deportation even if alien had court judgment declaring eligibility); Sled-
dens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1949).
15. U. S. ex tel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
1. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no person 3hall be
compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself. Similar provisions are ound
in all the state constitutions with the exception of Iowa and New Jersey, where the )rivi-
lege against self-incrimination exists as part of the common law. State v. Height, 177 lowa
650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527, 60 Atl. 202 (1905); See 8
Wigmore, Evidence, §2252, p. 320, n. 1 & 2 (3rd ed. 1940). If the Fifth Amendment
was literally interpreted the privilege could be inovked only in criminal actions. However,
the courts have liberally construed both the federal and the state provisions, giving the
clauses the same effect as the privilege had at common law. It can therefore be "nvoked
in both civil and criminal proceedings. Christal v. Police Comm'n. of San Francisco, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 264, 92 P.2d 416 (1936); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P.2d 313
(1936). A witness may not be contumacious in his refusal . To justify silence "t :nust
appear that the answer which might be given would have a direct tendency to "ncriminate.
United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Flegenheimer,
82 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1936). However, a witness is not required to show that the zesti-
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duties.2 In McAuliffe v. City of Bedford:t the dismissal of a police officer for
engaging in political activity contrary to police regulations was upheld. Mr.
justice Holmes, then sitting on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, stated:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." Applying the same reasoning, courts
have upheld the dismissal of police officers for the exercise of the privilege
against self-incrimination.I These decisions are consonant with the principle
that because police officers are hired for the purpose of disclosing and pre-
venting crime, any officer acquiring knowledge of facts tending to incriminate
anti person is under a duty to disclose such facts, and the refusal to do so is a
violation of that duty.- On the basis of either a statute" or a board ruling, 7
teachers may be discharged for invoking the privilege when questioned as to
communist affiliations. In the absence of legislation, however, there have been
virtually no dismissals because of the assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination, except in cases dealing with police officers."
noiny he declines to give is certain to subject him to prosecution, or that it will prove the
whole crime. It is sufficient that there be a reasonable possibility of prosecution, or that
the answer, if given, would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
for a crime. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U. S. 159 (1950); People v. Schultz, 380 111. 539, 44 N.E.2d 601, 603 (1942)
(dictum).
2. Christal v. Police Comm'n. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416
(1939); Drury v. Hurley, 339 II. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949) (Refusal to sign an im-
munity waiver amounted to a refusal, in advance, to relinquish benefits of the constitutional
privilege); Canteline v. McClellen, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940) (Police officer
dismissed for violating provision of the New York Constitution, Art. 1, §6, which -provided
for the removal of any public officer on his refusal to sign a wavier of immunity or
answer any questions concerning his conduct in office).
3. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
4. Cases cited note 2 supira.
5. "Among the duties of police officers are those of preventing the commission of
crime, of assisting in its detection, and of disclosing all information known to them which
may lead to the apprehension and punishment of those who have transgressed our laws.
When police officers acquire knowledge which will tend to incriminate any person it is
their duty to disclose such facts . . . It is for the performance of these duties that police
officers are commissioned and paid by the community, and it is a violation of said duties
for any police officer to refuse to disclose pertinent facts within his knowledge even though
such disclosure may show, or tend to show that he himself has engaged in criminal
activities." Christal v. Police Comm'n. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416
(1939); See also Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 315 Pa. 1, 156 Atl. 245 (1931) (Police
captain's refusal to answer specific charges was held "conduct unbecoming an officer" and
was ground for dismissal by Civil Service Commission).
6. Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d
373 (1954) (Dismissal was in accordance with a provision of the City Charter which pro-
vided for the termination of employment upon the employee's refusal to testify).
7, Board of Education v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App.2d 100, 270 P.2d 82, 85 (1954)
(Invoking privilege in face of school board's directive to disclose communist affiliations,
thereby frustrating attempts to determine teaching qualifications, held to be an unprofes-
sional act constituting ground for dismissal. The court said, "A teacher's employment fn
the public schools is a privilege, not a right. A condition implicit in that privilege is
loyality to the government under which the school system functions. It is the duty of
every teacher to answer proper questions in relation to his fitness to teach our youth, when
put to him by a lawfully constituted body authorized to propound such questions.").
8. Faxon v. School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 771, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954) (Court
affirmed dismissal in absence of statute or ruling requiring disclosure, stating that, "in a
constitutional sense it seems to us to make no difference whether a teacher .'*s dismissed
because of statutory provisions expressly providing for such dismissal or, as in the present
case, by an order of a public board acting within its statutory authority." However the
fact that the teacher in this case was employed to serve "at discretion" leaves unanswered
the question whether a teacher under contract or with tenure rights can be dismissed in
absence of statute); See also Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952)
(Statutory requirement that a teacher take an oath that he or she was not knowingly an
advocate of or a member in any subversive organization was held valid).
9. See Denying the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination To Public Officers, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 987, 989 (1955).
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Recently the Supreme Court of Illinois1o upheld a refusal of admission to
the bar of an applicant who refused to answer questions relating to his mem-
bership in the Communist Party. The court stated that granting the privilege
to practice law is conditional not only upon taking an oath to support the
federal and state constitutions,' but also upon proof of good citizenship, good
moral character, and general fitness to practice law. This proof became im-
possible when the exercise of the privilege prevented the Committee from in-
quiring fully into the applicant's qualifications. A Canadian Court, in refus-
ing an admitted communist admission to practice law said, ". . . Marxist
philosophy of law and government, in its essence, is so inimical in theory and
practice to our constitutional system and free society, that a person professing
them is eo ipso, not a fit and proper person to practice law . . .-1:1
A denial of admission to the bar must be distinguished from disbarnent.
While the primary object of both proceedings is to maintain the integrity of
the courts and protect the public,' 4 an applicant for admission to the bar has
the burden of establishing his fitness to be enrolled as an attorney.' In the
disbarment proceeding, however, the burden of proof is on the challenging
party,1" and whether the interest an attorney has in his profession be called
a property right, franchise, license, or privilege,' 7 it is one of which he can-
not be deprived without notice and an opportunity to defend.s
While several states have enacted statutes specifically enumerating the vari-
ous grounds for disbarment,19 it is usually held that the legislature cannot
curtail judicial power to determine the moral and ethical qualifications of
lawyers." Generally speaking, any conduct on the part of an attorney evi-
10. In re Anastaplo, 2 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954).
11. See In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945) (Applicant whose convictions forbade
him to bear arms in the defense of the state was denied admission to the bar on the ground
that he could not take the oath of allegiance to support and defend the constitution of the
state ).
12. "When an applicant, knowing of such conditions, applies for admission and signifies
that he will take the oath of lawyer, we think it inconsistent with the privilege he seeks
that he should be permitted to defeat pertinent inquiry into his ability to fulfill such con-
ditions... " In re Anastaplo, 2 1lU.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826, 832 (1954); See In re
Taylor, 309 Ky. 388, 217 S.W.2d 954 (1949) (Applicant for a license to practice law
has duty to disclose all facts pertaining to his qualifications, i.e. all facts that would put the
board of bar examiners or court on notice of any disqualifications).
13. Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia, 3 D.L.R. 173, 176 (1950).
14. In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1941); State V,. Finn, 32 Or. 519,
52 Pac. 756 (1898); In re Egan, 52 S.D. 394, 218 N.W. 1 (1928).
15. In re Anastaplo, 2 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954); in re Keennan, 310 Mass.
166, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1941) (dictum).
16. Re Morford, 7 Ter. 144, 80 A.2d 429 (Del. 1951) (Charges must be proven by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence); In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d
657 (1939) (Dismissal of charges for lack of evidence); In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 450,
59 Pac. 445 (1899) (Presumption of innocence until proven guilty); See Drinker, Legal
Ethics, p. 46 (1953).
17. Application of Dodd, 131 Conn. 702, 42 A.2d 36 (1945) ("Attorney has a franchise
which is a property right."); Lambdin v. State, 150 Fla. 814, 9 S.2d 192, 193 (1942)
("We practice law by the grace, not the right. The privilege to practice law is in no sense
proprietory. The State may grant or refuse it, or may withdraw it from those who abuse it.");
State v. Gozard, 70 S.D. 193, 16 N.W.2d 484 (1944) ("The right to practice law "s not
a vested or absolute right, nor is it a property right, but rather a permit ,license, franchise,
or privilege granted upon demonstration of satisfactory moral fitness and legal and general
learning.").
18. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866); In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96
(1938); In re Metzenbaum, 22 Wash.2d 75, 154 P.2d 602 (1945) (dictum); See Drinker,
Legal Ethics, p. 36 (1953) (Attorney before disbarment proceeding has no constitutional
right to confront witness, and, except in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, no right to a
trial by jury).
19. See e.g. N.D. Rev. Code §27-1402 (1943).
20. See 5 Ark. L. Rev. 411 (1950-51).
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dencing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which attend the relation-
ship of attorney and client, and his position as an officer of the court, consti-
tutes a ground for disbarment. " t Because adherence to the creed of any
subversive organization is incompatible with an attorney's oath to uphold the
laws of the federal and state government, membership in the Communist
Party is generally deemed sufficient evidence of unfitness to practice law.22
However, in the few cases that have arisen it has been held that the invoca-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination does not per se constitute evi-
dence of unfitness,2 In the case of In re Grae,2 4 an attorney who invoked
the privilege refused to sign a waiver of immunity when called upon to testify
in connection with an investigation into the unlawful practice of law. The
court said, "The constitutional privilege is a fundamental right and a measure
of duty; its exercise cannot be a breach of duty to the court."z 5 Similarily, an
Illinois court2 l held that a judge's failure to sign a waiver of immunity be-
fore a grand jury murder investigation, did not constitute such a violation of
his duty as a lawyer as to warrant disbarment. But, a different result was
reached where an attorney who was charged with membership in the Com-
munist Party failed to appear. The court concluded that because of the gravity
of the charge the attorney, as an officer of the court, was under a duty to
respond, and that his failure to do so constituted sufficient cause for dis-
barment.'27
The American Bar Association has expressed the opinion that an attorney's
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is sufficient ground for
disbarment.2'8 It reasons that the implications arising from the assertion
29 
of
the privilege are fatal":o belief in his charcater and integrity. This, in addition
to the enactment of the Smith ActO probably had great influence on the trial
court's order for disbarment in the instant case
21. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W.2d 730 (1943); In re Williams, 233 Mo. App.
1174, 128 S.W.2d 1098 (1939); In re Brown, 64 S.D. 87, 264 N.W. 521 (1936). The
passing of worthless checks, selling of opium, seduction on the promise of marriage, adult-
ery, commission of a crime and any misconduct involving moral turpitude have been held
grounds for disbarment on the basis of professional unfitness, see 15 Mo. L. Rev. 309 (1950).
22. In re Anastaplo, 2 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954); In re Margolis, 269 Pa.
206, 112 At]. 478 (1921); In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925) (Attorney
by publicly advocating a general strike to force liberation of persons imprisoned for viola-
tions of acts directed against teachings advocated by I.W.W. violated his oath to uphold the
law. Disbarment proper).
23. In re Holland, 377 111. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941); In re Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26
N.E.2d 967 (1940); In re Schneidkraut, 231 App. Div. 109, 246 N.Y.S. 505 (1930).
24. 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
25. Id. at 967.
26. In re Holland, 377 111. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
27. Welanko's Case, 99 N.H. 413, 112 A.2d 50 (1955). See In re Turnquist, 206 Minn.
104, 287 N.W. 795 (1936) (Attorney defaulted and an order of discipline was entered
upon the assumption that he was guilty as charged).
28. 40 A.B.A.J. 404, 405 (1954). See also 39 A.B.A.J. 344, 345 (1953) (Resolved
that inquiries be made into Communist affiliations and that determination be had concerning
fitness to practice law); 36 A.B.A.J. 948, 972 (1950) (Resolved that attorneys be :equired
to take loyalty oath); L. Wright, The Lawyer's Responsibility and the Fifth Amend., 34
Neb. L. Rev. 573 (1955).
29. Where attorney is charged with misconduct and he refuses to answer questions re-
lating to the charge, an inference arises that the testimony if given, would have been
unfavorable. Fish v. State Bar of California, 214 Cal. 215, 4 P.2d 937 (1931); In re
Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657, 665 (1939).
30. 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §10 (1946) provides: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . (3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of per-
sons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in
the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with
any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof."
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Experience has shown that the social and political overtones arising from
the assertion of the constitutional privilege generally constitute an effective
deterent to its exercise. But where they do not, the mere assertion of Fifth
Amendment rights should not be made a substitute for competent evidence
as the basis of a declaration of professional unfitness.
HAROLD W. E. ANDERSON
DIVORCE - DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY - WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS - Plaintiff obtained a divorce from her husband, the defendant, in a
community property state. In effectuating a division of the community prop-
e rty, the court awarded to the defendant all of the weekly workman's com-
pensation benefits he had been drawing following a totally and permanently
disabling injury sustained during coverture. Plaintiff appealed this award on
the ground that the weekly compensation benefits were paid the defendant in
lieu of wages and since wages were community assets, she was entitled to
share them with the defendant. The court held that the award be affirned.
Workmen's compensation benefits were not a part of the community prop-
erty, but were personal to the defendant and his separate property. Rich-
ards v. Richards, 59 N. M. 308, 283 P.2d 881 (1955).
The origin of the community property system has never been positively
determined,1 but its foothold in the United States was gained in those sectors of
the country originally under Spanish domination.* Because it was not a part
of the common law, it has survived only by statute.:' In a community prop-
erty state all property acquired by the husband or wife during the marital
relationship is a part of the community, except that received by gift, inheri-
tance, or devise,4 which is normally deemed the separate property of the re-
cipient as is that belonging to either before marrige.5
It appears that of the eight states6 using the community system four,- have
dealt directly with the problem in the principle case. Generally, damages re-
ceived as compensation for injuries to either the husband" or wife" are held
to fall into the community as property acquired during the marriage. This was
the theory adopted by the Arizona court in deciding that the benefits of work-
1. Garazi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64, 78 (1907) (dictum).
2. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897).
3. Nelson v. Nelson, 149 Minn. 285, 183 N.W. 354 (1921); Pridemore v. Duncan,
146 Okla. 70, 293 Pac. 266 (1930).
4. Wharburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1900); Pedder v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,
60 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932); Myer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 248 (1859).
5. Woods v. Maimy 69 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1934); Merren v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 51 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1931); Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501
(1917).
6. 2 Tiffaney, Real Property, §437 (3rd Ed. 1939).
7. E.g. Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 223 P.2d 907 (1950); Northwestren Red-
wood Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 184 Call. 484, 194 Pac. 31 (1920); Brownfield
v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940); Pickens v. Pickens, 125
Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935).
8. Cavagnaro v. Delmas, 29 Cal. App.2d 352, 84 P.2d 274 (1938); Southwestern
Engraving Co. of Dallas v. Hansen, 72 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Flowers v.
Smith, 80 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (dictum) (Damages for slander were
held to be a part of the community). Contra Fredrickson & Watson Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev.
117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940).
9. Cavagnaro v. Delmas, 29 Cal. App.2d 352, 84 P.2d 274 (1938); Swager v. Peterson,
49 Idaho 785, 291 Pac. 1049 (1930); Taylor v. Catalen, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.2d 102,
101 (1940) (dictum).
